Investor Relations （IR） in Business Communication on the Example of Poland

This paper focuses on investor relations （IR） as an element of companies＇ communication with the external environment. It shows the place and role of IR in communication with the general market, and the stock exchange market in particular. The study is illustrated with an example of IR in Poland, a relatively new European Union （EU） member state and an emerging market. As can be seen, IR goes beyond the traditionally understood maintenance of communication with the capital market. It is also shown that the main role of IR ought to be the reduction of investment risk and enhancement of the companies＇ value, which is of particular significance in light of the current globalization of capital markets. It has been found that Polish companies, especially those listed on the Warsaw Securities Exchange （WSE）, commonly rely on IR as a means of communication with the environment. And yet, as the results of the analysis show, the quality of that communication is still far from satisfactory, despite efforts undertaken by various external entities to encourage more focus on the development of IR, or understanding of the company＇s relevant staff of its important role.     

Pricing the Chicago Board of Trade T-Bond futures

The aim of this paper is to investigate the pricing of the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) Treasury-Bond futures. The difficulty in pricing it arises from its multiple inter-dependent embedded delivery options, which can be exercised at various times and dates during the delivery month. We consider a general Markov diffusion process model for stochastic interest rates and propose a pricing algorithm that can handle all the delivery rules embedded in the CBOT T-Bond futures. Our procedure combines dynamic programming, finite-elements approximation, and fixed-point evaluation. Numerical illustrations are provided under the one-factor Vasicek and Cox–Ingesoll–Ross models, and under the time in-homogeneous Hull–White model.     

证券经纪人制度建设的法律思考

本文通过对证券经纪人的法律地位、法律特征等方面的分析给出了在我国建设证券经纪人制度的基本原则和现实意义.     

证券公司需采取哪些措施才能做到有效合规

法律法规及规章制度的建立健全仅仅是合规管理工作开展的前提和基础,证券公司能否有效合规还必须通过努力,提升执行力。首先,提升证券公司高管对合规管理的全面认识,加强管理层的驱动作用。其次,给予合规管理工作及合规人员的正确定位。再次,加强对各部门的合规管理执行情况的考核力度。最后,不断提升合规管理工作人员的专业素质。     

证券市场上中小投资者权益保护机制初探

保护投资者的合法权益是证券法的立法宗旨，然而近几年证券市场上侵犯投资者权益的事件不断发生，在一定程度上已经影响到证券市场的稳定。《证券法》等法律法规中的诸多缺漏，使得其未能充分有效地发挥出保护中小投资者的合法权益、遏制违法行为的作用。应不断完善法律法规，强制信息公开制度，规范信息披露方式，并通过设立法律责任维护中小投资...     

How does issuing contingent convertible bonds improve bank's solvency? A Value-at-Risk and Expected Shortfall approach

This paper examines how issuing an innovative financial instrument called contingent convertible bond (CoCo) may enhance bank's solvency in comparison to issuing a conventional bond. CoCos convert automatically into common equity or have a principal write-down when bank's regulatory capital fails to meet a predetermined level. They have been invented and put into legislation with an objective to absorb losses thus preventing institutions from bankruptcy. From the standpoint of an issuer CoCos bring about two counter effects regarding his solvency: on one hand they recapitalize a bank approaching insolvency on the other hand CoCos pay much higher coupon comparing to conventional bonds. In our model a bank has two funding alternatives: either to issue CoCos or conventional bonds. We measure issuer's default risk using the concept of Value-at-Risk (VaR) and Expected Shortfall (ES). We conclude that CoCos have the potential to strengthen the resilience of the issuer on the condition that the probability of conversion triggering is higher than the VaR's significance level. Our findings can be helpful to the policymakers and banks to better understand the impact of CoCos on issuer's solvency.     

证券期货业信息技术发展中需关注的几个问题

证券期货行业已成为高度IT依赖性的行业,信息技术发展及信息技术安全问题始终是行业的存在与发展基础。然而,由于市场的快速发展与技术的持续跟进总是存在着互动差距,一个在业务与技术之间良性循环的技术生态环境仍亟待从IT制度设计、IT治理环节和IT文化实践等多个方面予以重视和推动。本文从行业信息技术发展中遇到的几个问题着手,探讨了这些问题产生的根源和影响,也提出了解决问题的基本思路,其主要的着眼点仍然在于建立行业良性技术生态环境所需要的各种制度准备和技术准备,并希望这些问题的提出与探讨能引起全行业的关注与讨论,以尽快找到最佳的解决路径。     

Earnings Management Surrounding New Debt Issues

We examine whether firms manage earnings before issuing bonds to achieve a lower cost of borrowing. We find significant income‐increasing earnings management prior to bond offerings. We also find that firms that manage earnings upward issue debt at a lower cost, after controlling for various bond issuer and issue characteristics. Our results are consistent with studies that report earnings management around equity issuance. The results indicate that, like equity holders, bondholders fail to see through the inflated earnings numbers in pricing new debt.     

承销商分析师与非承销商分析师利益冲突比较研究

基于证券分析师首次发表的关于2006~2008年A股市场IPO股票的研究报告数据,运用非参数检验与多元回归分析方法,对我国证券分析师利益冲突行为进行实证分析。研究结果表明,承销商分析师与非承销商分析师均存在乐观倾向,而且承销商分析师的投资评级更为乐观;市场对于承销商分析师与非承销商分析师关注股票的反应并无显著差异,表明我国证券市场投资者并没有认识到分析师的利益冲突行为。     

Do Shareholders Have Obligations to Stakeholders?

The question of whether, and to what extent, business managers have obligations to stakeholders has been the principal theme in much of recent business ethics literature. The question of whether shareholders have obligations to stakeholders, however, has not been addressed sufficiently. I provide some needed attention to this matter by examining the positions of shareholders in the contemporary world of investing. Their positions are considerably different than that often envisioned by business ethicists and economists where shareholders determine the directions of corporate activities through their voting decisions. Typical contemporary investors rarely control corporate activities. If they own corporate securities directly, generally they own too small an interest to exercise control. And, in most cases, they do not even own corporate securities directly, but, rather, own shares in funds. Because of the positions of shareholders today, it is highly questionable whether most have obligations to stakeholders. This has a significant implication for business managers. Whether or not shareholders have obligations to stakeholders, business managers have a greater obligation to educate shareholders about how corporate activities affect stakeholders. I provide a justification for that obligation and comment on how business managers might begin to fulfill it.